PATHE:
THE LANGUAGE AND
PHILOSOPHY
OF EMOTIONS

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE
HELD IN BELGRADE ON 16 AND 17 MARCH 2017

Edited by
Ljiljana Radenović,
Dragana Dimitrijević and Il Akkad

University Library
2019, Belgrade

Referees of the volume

Prof. Violeta Gerjikova, Sofia University 'St. Kliment Ohridski'
Prof. Vesna Dimovska-Janjatova, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje
Dr. Marcela Andoková, Comenius University in Bratislava
Prof. Drago Đurić, University of Belgrade

Contents

Marko Teodorski
Institute for Literature and Arts
Belgrade

Melancholy and Oppression:
Aristotle, Pseudo-Hippocrates
and Lars von Trier[1]

Abstract: In the 20th century (from Sigmund Freud to DSM-$_5$), melancholy was approached as a personal, intimate, depressive affliction, and, consequently, melancholic patients were seen as lethargic, despondent, pensive patients, unable to emotionally experience the world around them. This paper approaches melancholy from a different perspective, putting an emphasis on the symbolic social oppression that the afflicted experience. To that end, it turns to its ancient Greek roots, where melancholic symptoms ranged from aggressive fits and dejected moods, to uncontrollable, puzzling laughter. Starting with a comparative analysis of Lars von Trier's *Melancholia* and Pseudo-Hippocrates's *Letter to Damagetus*, the paper sketches melancholy as the subject's inability/ unwillingness to conform to social rules and expectations, and to appropriate the language of their culture. Both the inability and unwillingness to conform to the prescribed set of rules and conducts are explained as consequence of failure of the culturally specific system of signs (*langage*) to properly signify and interpellate the subject. It is in the Aristotelian notion of melancholy as the ability of some to be "out of order" (*perittoí*) and "out of themselves" (*ekstatikoí*) that the paper searches for a possible explanation of this failure.

Keywords: melancholy, *Problems* XXX, *Letter to Damagetus*, *perittós*, *ekstatikós*, transcendence, social and symbolic oppression

INTRODUCTION

To many readers, melancholy is synonymous with depression. This specific notion stretches far into the past, all the way to the ancient Greek Hippocratic *Aphorisms* VI. XXIII that says: "[f]ear and depression that is prolonged means melancholia". This mantra, taken out of the context of the ancient Greek medicine, has served as a compass for numerous scientists, philosophers, artists, doctors (and laymen), as they embarked on the pilgrimage of discussing, wrestling with and reinterpreting melancholy. From the ancient commentators of Hippocratic texts, to Renaissance writers and modern psychiatrists, melancholy changed its countenance countless times, but its face remained the same: the face of an individual abyss and auto-hostility whose *raison d'être* cannot be precisely contoured.

However, even if the face of melancholy remained the same, these expressions varied significantly between epochs and, within epochs, between the authors who sought their explanation. In the ancient world it was generally agreed that melancholy resulted from the excess of the notorious "black bile" (*melaina chole*), leading to a number of diverse symptoms. These symptoms could be depression and despondency, but also lustfulness, restlessness, blindness or epilepsy. Starting from Aristotle, the disease got a new twist to it, adding the extraordinariness of character to the list. In his opus (to be discussed later in greater detail), Aristotle believed that the madmen (melancholics included) suffered from too much body heat that caused strong movements in their "heart" (*phren*[2]), considered to be the seat of intelligence (*Problems* XXX. 4, 957a3). Consequently, their perception was disturbed (*Parts of Animals* III. 10, 672b28–30). However, in his spurious *Problems*, this bodily/mental sensitivity had turned into a character trait that allowed some of the grandest names in history their potential for greatness. Renaissance writers, such as Marsilio Ficino (*De vita sana*), further developed this image of a preternatural melancholic soul capable of magnificent flights into poetry and science, creating one of those well-known images of solitary

---

2 *Phren* is a word that, in fact, indicates "diaphragm" in the heart region, which was considered to be the "seat of intelligence". In *The Sacred Disease* XX. 23-28, Hippocrates is not sure about its connection to the thinking processes, but Aristotle, in *Parts of Animals* III. 10, 672b28–30, believes it has its share in them.

thinkers and thought-burdened sensitive minds the French romanticists fell irreversibly in love with.[3] During the twentieth century, melancholy got its psychoanalytical twist and became a fragment of the ego that turned upon itself (Freud 1916), while still being celebrated as the source of the sublime and creativity by some (Kristeva 1989).

Come the 21st century and the ruling compendium of mental disorders – DSM-$_5$ (*Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition*) – that still characterises melancholy as a trait of bipolar and depressive disorders.[4] Now, it is not an illness in itself, but, rather, it is descriptive of other mental afflictions. Some of the traits of melancholy, as indicated by the DSM-$_5$ (2013: 151, 185) today, are "loss of pleasure in all, or almost all, activities; [...] a distinct quality of depressed mood characterised by profound despondency, despair, and/or moroseness or by so-called empty mood; [...] marked psychomotor agitation or retardation; [...] excessive and inappropriate guilt". Finally, the glossary of technical terms at the end of the manual says: "Melancholia (melancholic) [–] a mental state characterized by a very severe depression" (DSM-$_5$ 2013: 824).

It seems that, if the DSM-$_5$ is to be believed, melancholy, in spite of all the transformations and efforts of thinkers to connect it to the realm of creativity and sensitiveness, has remained an unbearable emotional state that eclipses the pleasure of the afflicted, making them dumb and inert and pulling them into a bottomless pit of despondency and despair. Understood in these terms, as a mental illness (or as a set of characteristic traits that accompany other mental illnesses), melancholy comes across as a personal, inner demon that eats at the patient's being, withdrawing them from the world into their own private inner cage, and alienating them from their family, friends, society and culture – even from their very own selves. Melancholy means solitude, a personal battle with the wrath of their own reclusive spirits.

Melancholy is, it seems, the anti-sociality incarnate.

The aim of this paper is, obviously, to show the force with which melancholy

---

3 In French romanticism, melancholy was considered as part of *le mal du siècle* ("the pain of the century"), along with ennui and disillusionment. See, Charlton 1984; Hoog 1954; Starobinski 2010.

4 For the problems regarding the classification and general consensus on nosography of mental disorders, see Simon 2013.

acts upon a subject. However, its aim is also to *deconstruct* it, to symbolically *empower* it, and to expose its strong *social* component. This component is something that should not be taken lightly and cannot be emphasised enough. Melancholic patients are never alone in their "disorder": even "disturbed", they are still part of the society, however that society reacted and whatever it decided to do about them. These inner demons of depression and solitude can be considered as a disorder needed to be cured (as DSM-$_5$ clearly shows), but, as I intend to show in this paper, sometimes they can be considered an inability (or unwillingness) of the subject to conform to the prescribed social rules; namely, to symbolic social oppression. This leads to withdrawal from that society, withdrawal from the pressure caused by social expectations, and from – to the melancholics – clearly visible meaninglessness of those expectations.

To that end, to the end of dealing with melancholy not only as a *personal affliction*, but as an issue of *social oppression* as well, I will start with a juxtaposition of Lars von Trier's and Pseudo-Hippocrates's representations of this psychological state, from where I will go back to the founding texts on melancholy – to Hippocrates, to Aristotle's general opus and to his *Problems* XXX. There I will search for a possibility to envisage melancholy not as an escape into flights of dubious mental fancies, but into a transcendence that frees the afflicted from the bonds of the society and culture. Thus, my reading of von Trier's and Pseudo-Hippocrates's texts does not portray melancholy as a depressive personal ghost perennially haunting the subject, but as a psychological insight into the pettiness of human affairs and into the rules that bind an individual to their culture. In that manner, melancholy in my reading is interpreted as means of escaping not sanity, but rules and expectations that continually bind us by language – as a possible way out of the oppression of the culturally specific system of signs (*langage*). I will show that von Trier and Pseudo-Hippocrates present us with similar – but still different – ideas of melancholy where cultural rules, codes and expectations (as systems of signs) fail to signify, interpellate and oppress the subject due to its inability (or unwillingness) to conform to it.

This paper came into being as a result of deep fascination with, and a personal experience of, depressive characterical predispositions. I find it im-

portant to stress this fact, and to lay it bare from the outset, since passions, apprehensions and forebodings ineluctably guide researchers through their work. There is no escaping them, and no denying them; the best we can do is to become aware of them naming them for what they are, and, through that awareness, distance ourselves from them. This distance, vital and indispensable, is the only real epistemological tool we possess.

Melancholy – that overburdening and puzzling psychological and emotional affliction – has intermittently played a crucial role in my private life. It has been characterised by heaviness, sporadically laced with moments of deep anxiety; it followed me throughout my carrier as a shadow never to be fully severed from its source. It possesses power that is overwhelming; it thrives in allure that is nearly indestructible. The need to withdraw from the world, to shut yourself off from it, to pensively leave the body while it sinks into neglect and abandonment is something that, once embraced, never fully leaves the individual. Many readers will share (maybe reluctantly, but still) this personal connection to the topic. Depressive moods are by no means limited to the present, and, in the modern world, they are more prominent than ever (Harris 2013: 2; Petsko 2012). That is precisely why it is important to continue finding ways of discussing them from an empowering and constructive point of view.

Lars von Trier and Pseudo-Hippocrates: reciprocal illumination

In order to flesh out the issue of social oppression in melancholy and emphasise the inability (or unwillingness) of melancholics to conform to the cultural system of signs, I will start by way of a short reciprocal illumination.[5] I will juxtapose two examples separated by almost two and a half millennia: Lars von Trier's 2011 cinematic masterpiece *Melancholia* and Pseudo-Hippocrates's *Letter to Damagetus*. Both these "texts" (the visual and the graphic one), present melancholics as crucially inseparable from the people around them and both treat melancholy as a response to

5 Reciprocal illumination, as defined by Arvind Sharma (2005: 247), is an analytical method that compares two phenomena with the aim of more clearly contouring the limits of both, without necessarily raising claims about their interconnectedness.

symbolic oppression. However, where they truly diverge from each other (where they reciprocally illumine each other) is in the way this response is painted for us: von Trier's melancholy is apocalyptic and pessimistic, while Pseudo-Hippocrates's is optimistic and transcendental.

Melancholia by Lars von Trier portrays the relationship between two sisters, Justine (melancholic) and Claire, while an extrasolar planet Melancholia approaches the Earth, threatening to destroy it on its path. The film is a multi-layered masterpiece that beautifully weaves together slow-motion frames, eerie static images that, in its mood and composition, mimic the Flemish painting of the 16th century[6], and nosographic symbolism of melancholy that creates strong, cumbersome emotions in the viewer. It consists of two chapters, each dedicated to one of the sisters. However, in this text I am interested in the first one that describes the melancholic Justine.

The whole chapter concerns Justine's wedding. From the initial ceremony at a rich American upper-class estate, to the wedding's end late in the night, Justine makes an enormous effort to seem pleased and content, but she cannot properly cope with the constant pressure of expectations from almost everyone around her. Her sister and her brother-in-law (who paid for the wedding) usher her to be happy; her husband expects her to fulfil her first wedding night obligations; at the table, food tray must go from left to right (and not the other way around); the wedding bouquet must be thrown and the bride and groom must initiate the dance floor; there is a program to be followed, with exact times for the cake, lampoons, dance and lottery. As the night drags on, her mood changes, and we see that beneath the smile that seemed appropriate and responsive, Justine becomes apathetic and drowsy, incapable of truly experiencing the expected exuberance of emotions. She feels ever more withdrawn and melancholic: her posture is cracking, her moves are lethargic, and she feels tired and sleepy. Finally, unable to cope with the social pressure of the wedding any longer, Justine turns to her sister Claire: "I'm trudging in through this," she says, "praying really hard. It's clinging to my legs. It's really heavy to drag along." "No, you're not," answers Clair, completely dismissing her inner being.[7]

---

6 During the opening number, as well as during the rest of the film, Pieter Bruegel's piece *The Hunters in the Sno*w (*Jagers in de Sneeuw*) is a recuring theme.

7 This dialogue (28.39'–29.17') references one of the slow-motion sequences from the

The event of the wedding provides us with a forceful image of a melancholic patient withdrawing from the world in her inability to conform to social rules. There is a certain language she needs to learn, and that is the language of her culture. This language needs to be appropriated, internalised and lived. In order to remain sane, to belong to the world, she (as a subject) has to let herself be shaped by this language – the system of signs has to mark her (she has to learn when to smile and when to be happy, and that the food tray goes from left to right and not the other way around). Namely, she has to be signified by this language and to appropriate an intelligible meaning if she is to belong to the world.

The problem with Justine is that she is incapable of doing it. For some reason, she has not been given the ability to understand and share this language like others do; she sees meaninglessness in all the expectations imposed on her. She tries to belong, but all she can do is take that ponderous cultural baggage and put it on her shoulders, never being able to actually appropriate it. The pressure of the society drives her "melancholic", she feels like sinking into the soil. She is despondent, desperate and empty; she feels guilty; nothing brings her joy (even the food "tastes like ashes"); she is rendered speechless and almost paralysed by the burden of the society cast upon her. Justine wants to internalise the cultural expectations so she could painlessly play along – she sees that everyone around her manages to do it and throughout the whole chapter she tries really hard. However, something inside of her is not letting her do it, so, in her melancholy, the language of the culture fails to signify her and turn her into an obedient subject.

After sketching Justine's melancholic portrait, I will leave her aside for a moment and turn to the other text of this short reciprocal illumination, to *Letter to Damagetus*[8], generally believed to be of anecdotal nature, not pretending to any historical validity (Ahonen 2014: 226). At this point, however,

---

opening scene, where Justine "runs" over the estate's golf course in her wedding gown, while strong multitudinous roots are grabbing her feet, pulling her to the ground. The scene, being a slow-motion of an act that otherwise should have been aggressively kinetic and energetic, produces strong emotion of hindrance and desperation.

8 *Letter to Damagetus* are, in fact, letters 10-17 of a larger whole, and they belong to Hippocrates's pseudepigrafic writings, along with other *Letters* and *Decrees.* The letters have been edited by W.D. Smith (1990).

the historical validity is of no importance, since what I am interested in is not the reconstruction of "real" events regarding Hippocrates's life, but a specific fictional portrait of a person suffering from melancholic affliction.

The story concerns the philosopher Democritus and his encounter with Hippocrates. The good people of Abdera, a Thracian polis at the Aegean shore, have called Hippocrates the Asclepiad from the island of Kos to come to Abdera and cure Democritus who had apparently gone mad. The problem is that Democritus lives an isolated life, forgetting about everything and everyone (himself included). He is withdrawn and pensive, and he takes everything to be the object of his research, even the Hades itself. He listens to the voices of birds and he believes that he travels through eternity. Sometimes, he talks to himself, or sings in half-voice. His face looks pale, corresponding visually to the rest of his behaviour. However, the worst of all, what frightens the good people of Abdera the most is that Democritus *laughs* intolerably at everyone and everything. He laughs at fortunate events, as well as at illness and suffering; he laughs at war and killing, at poverty and despair, he takes life and death equally amusing. Half-convinced that Democritus is actually sane, and half-assuming that he has become *melancholic*, Hippocrates takes off for Abdera to witness this "madness" first-hand.

Much as in the previous text, the issue of social oppression in the affliction (which Hippocrates will assume to be melancholy) is pushed to the fore. Democritus himself does not bother to think about his own predicament, or to call Hippocrates to come and cure him. Democritus himself does not think about himself as being "insane" – he is "insane" in the eyes of the society. The people around him are the ones expecting him to behave and look fittingly: to be sociable and affable, or sad and grieving when appropriate.

Right from the start, it is clear that, Democritus's and Justine's situations are reversely similar: while she is expected to laugh and be merry, Democritus is expected to cry and grieve when appropriate. However, there are no exact rules of conduct and no one is expected to be happy or sad all the time. What is important, however, is that the reaction of an individual is appropriate to the context.

The very fact that the whole city of Abdera has gotten together in the plea to Hippocrates puts a strong emphasis on the social aspect of Democritus's affliction. The whole city identifies with him. In their distress, this is what

they tell Hippocrates: "[y]ou will cure the whole city, not just one man; our sick council, that is under a treat of being closed, you need to open again, like a legislator, like a judge, like an archon, like a saviour; come and you will be the maker of it all" (Pseudo-Hipokrat 2007: 28). There is something wrong with Democritus, but Hippocrates is not called upon to cure "only one man": he needs to cure the whole city. By curing Democritus, the affliction of the (melancholic) madness will be lifted from the society as a whole. What comes across as clear is the connection between the madness of an individual (Democritus) and that of the social, legislative structure of the city. Melancholy, if that is Hippocrates's diagnosis of Democritus, is an affliction of the society, and not only of one isolated individual.

As we can see, the good people of Abdera are not terrified by Democritus's laughter for Democritus's own sake – they are terrified by it for the sake of the city and its institutions, its laws and its rules. By looking at Democritus who laughs uncontrollably, the Abderites see their own doom, the collapse of their own institutions. Democritus's laughter is a treat to the established rules of their culture; it undermines that culture, it undermines its codes and expectations, making them sick and fragile. "It seems to us, Hippocrates, that our customs are sick", finally they cry, "that our customs have gone mad" (Pseudo-Hipokrat 2007: 28).

Much like Justine, Democritus does not succumb to cultural expectations – he does not internalise the language of his culture. However, while Justine does so out of sheer incapacity that leaves her mortified and paralyzed, Democritus might have a different reason for it since his reaction is not numbness, but constant and terrifying laughter.

Thus we come to the crucial question: if both characters are melancholic; if they both suffer symbolic oppression; if Justine is broken and morose; why, on Earth, is Democritus *laughing*? Is there true difference between their responses to oppression, or are they both just two sides of the same coin?

For the sake of answering this question, it is necessary to take a detour through ancient texts on melancholy, such as texts from Hippocratic corpus, Aristotle's *Problems*, as well as his opus in general. To the end of understanding what is so specific about Democritus's laughter (and Justine's despondency), it is necessary to understand a very peculiar and abstruse place melancholy occupied within the ancient culture.

What are the premises of the ancient understanding of melancholy, since they are so obviously different from the modern ones? The first (chronologically speaking) source we encounter are numerous texts from the Hippocratic corpus, dated between the 5th century BC and the 2nd century AD.[9] Within them, we can establish some general rules on which ancient medicine, as well as the history of melancholy, rests upon, and that is the *humoral theory*.

The earliest mention of humours (bodily fluids) can be found in *Nature of Man*[10] (IV. 1-3) where one's health is described as the result of a fragile balance (*krasis*) between four bodily humours: blood, phlegm, yellow and black bile.[11] Sickness (*nósos*) emerges when that balance is disturbed and when one of the humours prevails (or lacks dramatically)[12]. Depending on the prevailing humour (as well as on the scale of prevalence), different problems (even "mental disorders") in the body occur. [13] Melancholy, spe-

---

9 I say "corpus" because it is generally agreed that these texts, commonly named as Hippocratic, were written by a number of different authors (Jones 1957: xxviii-xxxi). Their styles are different, their arguments are diverse, some fundamental positions regarding the science of medicine vary (its relationship with philosophy and religion, for example); occasionally, they even contradict each other.

10 *Nature of Man* has variously been attributed to Hippocrates himself, as well as to his son-in-law Polybus (Fredrich 1889: 55; Jones 1957: xxviii), and its theory of humours draws heavily on Empedoclean philosophy of the elements, as well as on the Alcmaean notions of qualities (Klibansky et al. 1979: 5-8).

11 It must be noted that most Hippocratic texts follow the presuppositions of the humoral theory, but the number of humors, as well as their actual effects, vary greatly. For example, Timotheus of Metapontus believed there was only one acid salty humor, while Herodicus of Cnidus argued for two of them, one sour and one bitter. Euryphon of Cnidus, on the other hand, believed in an indefinite number of them (Klibansky et al. 1979: 8)

12 For example, if a body suffers from an excess of phlegm, and it is, thus, purged from it properly, the balance is restored. However, if the phlegm is purged excessively, the body will lack it, causing other humors to prevail and disturbing the balance once again (*Nature of Man* IV. 8-20).

13 From the 5th century BC on, melancholy became a "mental disorder" that intensely occupied the minds of those who meditated on the psychological life of an individual, and almost every philosopher (every physician certainly) tried to explain it in a certain fashion. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Diocles of Carystus, Cicero, Aretaeus of Cappadocia, Caelius Aurelianus, Galen, Rufus of Ephesus, Celsus, and the list goes on. After the 5th

cifically, occurs when the black bile prevails, hence the name melancholy (*melaina chole,* "black bile").[14] Considering the fact that, in ancient culture, all illnesses were believed to originate from the physiology of the body, and were fundamentally linked to the physiology of the humours, classicists tend to agree that, as far as the ancient sources go, mental afflictions, such as melancholy, phrenitis, mania and epilepsy originated in it as well (Ahonen 2014: 10).[15] Today, DSM-$_5$ creates some clear dividing lines between psychological and physiological disorders, but this line was not as clear for the ancient philosophers and physicians who were not familiar with strict "mental" structures, such as the unconscious.[16]

and 4th centuries BC, the greatest portion of ancient sources on melancholy comes from the 1st and the 2nd centuries AD. Toohey (2004) raises the question of this gap in the extant written material on melancholy between the late Classical/early Hellenistic period and on the late antiquity. There is a distinct possibility that the gap exists due to a lack of preserved sources. However, it is also possible that the sudden awakening of interest in melancholy, after several centuries of silence, is due to more frequent appearances of this affliction. He interprets this reawakening as an increase in the consciousness of the self and as a stronger split of the subject between himself/herself and the outside world (heightening of the "inside/outside" dichotomy). On Theophrastus and melancholy, see Flashar 1962: 713-714; on Diocles of Carystus, see van der Eijk 2000 and Flashar 1966: 50-59; on melancholy in Cicero, see Kazanzidis 2013: Caelius Aurelianus discussed melancholy in the treatise *On Chronic Disease*, see Drabkin, I. E. 1950; on Rufus of Ephesus, see Pormann, P. E. 2008; on Galen see, Hankinson, R. J. ed. 2008; Jackson, S. W. 1969; Johnston, I. 2006.

14 For a detailed account of the relationship between melancholy and the black bile, see Flashar 1966, Ahonen 2014, Klibansky 1979.

15 In his study of emotions in ancient Greek culture, Konstan (2006: 39) considers it as just one of "generalized moods", along with "the feelings inspired by music, wonder or awe at nature's grandeur […] and disgust at pallid or slimy things". Concerning epilepsy, the so-called sacred disease, ancient authors generally disagreed on its status as a mental affliction. On the general discussion of madness in ancient philosophy and culture, see Ahonen 2014: 9-26, but also Jouanna 2013, Hughes 2013, O'Brien-Moore 1924, Simon 1978 and 2008.

16 In ancient Greece, inquiry into psychological issues (such as melancholy or mania) frequently involved discussions on the soul and its relationship with the body. Thus, it was not rare that treatise on "mental disorders" (such as *The Sacred Disease*) walked a fine line between religious, medical and philosophical perspectives. Although opinions vary between authors, it was generally thought that the seat of intelligence was not the brain, but the heart, whose functioning and relation to the bodily fluids determined what we today call the "mental state of the patient". For example, the writer of *The Sacred Disease* believes that the brain is the cognitive seat of the body, while Aristotle (*Movement of Animals* 8-10,

What is the most important for my argument, however, is the fact that, unlike the modern times, where melancholy is represented as an inert, heavy and grief-stricken state, in ancient texts a melancholic could exhibit a potentially infinite number of characteristics: they could be apoplexic (*Aphorisms* VI. LVI), despondent and withdrawn (*Epidemics* III. 67-71), as well as lustful (*Problems* XXX. 1,953b), irritable, insomnious, restless (*Epidemics* III, 67-71), they may experience convulsions, madness and blindness (*Aphorisms* VI. LVI), or even loss of speech (*Aphorisms* VII. XL). In some cases, melancholy was the result of too much heat and dryness (*Airs, Water, Places* X. 88-91), in some rare cases it was the result of too much moisture (*On Memory* 2,453a14). Thus, melancholy as a severe "mental" affliction of the ancient world presented itself as a kind of anxious agitation that could lead to two possible extremes: on the one hand, there were symptoms descriptive of manic fits and aggression, while on the other there were severe depressive episodes.[17] As Jackie Pigeaud (Pižo 2007: 25) astutely observed, in ancient time melancholics were "essentially polymorphous" beings. Their only constant was, paradoxically, their moody and wistful *changeability*.

Aristotle and the extraordinariness of the melancholics

After the Hippocratic groundwork on melancholy, with Aristotle we are moving one step closer towards the nature of Democritus's laughter.

In Aristotle's general opus (apart from *Problems* XXX), there is no direct treatment of the disease called "melancholy".[18] Instead, Aristotle touches upon this affliction while dealing with other problems (such as luck, divine intervention, will-control or prophetic dreams). Melancholy is never ap-

---

701b33-703b2) was assured it was the heart (*phren*). Alcmaeon of Croton was the first one to introduce the brain centered theory of intelligence. For further discussion on the topic, see van der Eijk 2005.

17 Ancient authors, most of them from the beginning of the Christian era (such as Galen, Rufus of Ephesus or Celsus), continued debating the exact nature and definition of melancholy, but a general consensus on what melancholy was and why it appeared was never reached (Ahonen 2014: 19)

18 For general discussion on Aristotle and melancholy, see van der Eijk 1990.

proached as an illness in itself, but as a set of traits characteristic of a certain temperament (such as the melancholic one). Moreover, Aristotle mentions black bile only once, in the treatise *On Sleep*, where he claims (in accordance with the Hippocratic notion of melancholy), that the black bile is cold. In this passage, melancholics (the "atrabilious") are described as deprived of sleep, which is why they have "large appetites, though [they are] spare and lean; for their bodily condition is as if they derived no benefit from what they eat" (3,457a27). In *On Memory*, Aristotle explains why some people are disturbed by the inability to recollect something, and melancholics are, in this respect, particularly disadvantageous. Their predicament results from "[too] much moisture around that part which is the center of sense-perception [...]. For when once the moisture has been set in motion it is not easily brought to rest, until the idea which was sought for has again presented itself, and thus the movement has found a straight course" (2,453a14-19). This, for Aristotle, might be the reason why melancholics have troubles controlling their emotions (Ahonen 2014: 97; Sorabji 1972: 112-113). In *Nicomachean Ethics*, when talking about the weakness of will-control, Aristotle differentiates between those who are rash (and in that rashness incapable of controlling themselves), and those who are simply weak (thus incapable to live up to their own decisions). Melancholics ("the excitable people") fall into the first category, as they continually follow their inner images (*phantasia*). Aristotle concludes that "[o]f the forms of incontinence, that of excitable people is more curable than that of those who deliberate but do not abide by their decisions, and those who are incontinent through habituation are more curable than those in whom incontinence is innate; for it is easier to change a habit than to change one's nature" (*Nic. Ethics* VII. 10, 1152a27-31). A bit later in the same treatise, we are told that the excitable people (i.e. melancholics) suffer from urges and are always in "need of relief". They are in constant "torment" because of their composition, and they are always "under the influence of violent desire". However, this torment is contradicted by "any chance pleasure if it be strong", making melancholics "self-indulgent and bad" (*Nic. Ethics* VII. 14, 1154a12-15).

However, for the purposes of understanding Democritus's behaviour, probably the most important discussion is of melancholics as prone to prophetic dreams and visions in *Eudemian Ethics* and *On Divination in Sleep*. In *Eudemian*

Ethics, it is said that melancholics are "dreamers of what is true", insofar as their "reasoning-power is relaxed". This is so because there is a moving principle (*arkhē*) in the human soul that enables the constant movement of reason (thoughts). Hence, the moving principle is of a higher cognitive level than reason (*nous*) itself, and it "seems to become stronger when the reasoning-power is relaxed" (*Eud. Ethics* VII. 14, 1248a40). Melancholics, it would seem, are those in whom reasoning-power is relaxed, thus they have access to the moving principle itself. This "gift" of direct access to *arkhē* is the reason for their having prophetic dreams, or, as Ahonen (2014: 95) says, they are "able to enjoy the benefits of divine inspiration directly". The same notion could be found in *On Divination in Sleep*, where thoughts of melancholics are described as extraordinarily agile, and thus prone to evasion of reason. In spite of the Aristotle's claim from the same treatise that "the power of foreseeing the future and of having vivid dreams is found in persons of inferior type", such as "garrulous and melancholic [who] see sights of all descriptions" (2, 463b16-18), Aristotle further on claims that melancholics, due to their mental simplicity, are extremely intuitive. "Atrabilious persons," he says, "owing to their impetuosity, are, when they, as it were, shoot from a distance, expert at hitting; while, owing to their mutability, the series of movements deploys quickly before their minds" (2, 464b1-5).

As it can be seen, Aristotle is not particularly in favour of those suffering from melancholic affliction. He considers them rash, out of control, inferior, desire-driven, tormented, self-indulgent and bad. This list in itself is enough to show his negative opinion on the affliction, which is precisely the reason why his *Problems* XXX are considered spurious.[19] Compared to the rest of his opus, it is fair to say that this treatise has a quite different, if not directly positive tone. However, Aristotle does think of melancholics to be intuitive in their inferiority and extraordinarily agile in their mental simplicity – all characteral and psychological "shortcomings" that allow them to go over-and-beyond reasoning of everyday men. Although the tone concerning mel-

---

19 The treatise has occasionally been attributed to Theophrastus, who succeeded Aristotle as the head of the Peripatetic school. Diogenes Laertius in *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (5, 44) lists his work *On Melancholy* (not preserved). See, for example, Ahonen 2014: 98 and Flashar 1962: 713-714. There are authors, such as Harris 2013 and Kazantzidis 2013 who are referencing the author as Pseudo-Aristotle.

ancholics between *Eudemian Ethics*, *On Divination in Sleep* and *Problems* XXX differ, *Problems* (whoever the author was) do connect to the genuinely Aristotelian themes (Klibansky et al. 1979: 39). *Problems* XXX puts the rest of them in perspective, and paves the way to its latter iterations, in both the ancient world and the modern period. Consequently, it is this text that will provide us with a better understanding of Democritus's laughter, too.

PROBLEMS XXX.I: PERITTÓS, EKSTATIKÓS, MANIKÓS

   Problems XXX[20] famously starts with a question that shot melancholy right into history: "Why is it that all those who have become eminent (*perittoi*) in philosophy or politics or poetry or the arts are clearly of an atrabilious temperament, and some of them to such an extent as to be affected by diseases caused by black bile, as is said to have happened to Heracles among the heroes?" (953a).[21] Obviously, the main idea of the text is to prove that melancholic people possess a potential for greatness, and Aristotle uses Hercules, Ajax, Bellerophon, Empedocles, Socrates and Plato as examples for this (953a). He gives reasons for including all of them – from Hercules's madness, to solitary wanderings of Bellerophon and intellectual capriciousness of Socrates – but Aristotle's argument concludes that greatness given to melancholics necessarily involves being "out of self" (*ekstatikós*) (as opposed to being permanently insane, as in *manikós*). "[I]f […] heat approaches the region of the intellect," says Aristotle, "[many] are affected by diseases of frenzy and possession; and this is the origin of Sibyls and soothsayers and all inspired persons, when they are affected not by disease but by natural temperament. Maracus, the Syracusan, was actually a better poet when he was *out of his mind* (*ekstatikós*)" (954a34-40). As it is immediately clear, Forster translates *ekstatikós* as "out of his mind", instead as "out of himself".

---

20 By the virtue of presenting a (for that time) rare perspective on melancholy and its relationship to the intellectual capacities of an individual, the treatise has been studied extensively. See, for example, Flashar 1966: 60-72, Jackson 1986: 31-33, Padel 1995: 55-7, Simon 1978: 228-237, van der Eijk 1990, Klibansky et al. 1964: 15-41 and Radden 2000: 55-60.

21 Translation by E. S. Forster.

This difference in translation is quite understandable, if subtle nuances in the Greek vocabulary of madness are not taken into consideration.[22] Thus, in order to appreciate the diversity of the vocabulary, it is necessary to pay closer attention to three terms that play crucial part in this analysis. Firstly, it is necessary to explain the discursive nature of the term *perittós* ("extraordinary"), and secondly we need to appreciate the difference between terms *manikós* ("insane") and *ekstatikós* ("being out of self"). Different authors have translated these terms in various ways, emphasising their different facets.

Perittós is probably the easiest one of the three to deal with, since its translations, more or less, fall within the same category – of something which is unnecessary and excessive, understood both derogatory and laudatory. Two eminent translations, whose work establishes the basis for further readings of Aristotle's *Problems*, translated *perittós* as "eminent" (E. S. Forster) and "outstanding" (W. S. Hett), capturing, from the outset, the nuance of something superfluous and over-the-top. In more recent translations (Pižo 2007; Klibansky et al. 1979; Jovanović 2007), the complimentary notion of *perittós* in *Problems* XXX has been strongly emphasized. Jovanović translates it as "extraordinary", arguing for Aristotle's interest in the individuals that "cannot be classified", that are "out of the ordinary" and "unique", and of the paramount importance for the community (Jovanović 2007: 19, n.4). In *Saturn and Melancholy*, Klibansky et al. understand *perittós* as a "neutral conception, implying no more than a deviation from normal conditions or behavior in one direction or another", and they argue for the translation "abnormal". However, in the introduction of *Problems* XXX, the context explicitly calls for a favourable connotations, so they agree that "abnormal" should be replaced by "outstanding" (Klibansky et al. 1979: 31). Finally, Jackie Pigeaud shrewdly connects *perittós* with the word *perrissôma* – surplus or residue. Since in *Problems* (I. 861b18-20) it is explained that melancholy is caused by the residual nature of black bile (that gets overheated and evaporates leaving residue behind), he concludes that Aristotle's "exceptional man is the man of the residue *par excellence*" (Pižo 2007: 26).

Eminent, outstanding, unclassified, unique, abnormal, residual, unordinary, extraordinary – these are the interpretations of the *perittoí*, of the melancholic

22 For a detailed account on the Greek vocabulary of madness, see Thumiger 2013 and Ahonen 2014: 31-34.

individuals so elusive and non-conforming that even vocabulary cannot define them properly. Whether they are superfluous as the residue that remains after heated black bile, or abnormal in their amorphous mentality, melancholics appear essentially displaced and discrepant. They are extra-ordinary in the most literal sense of the word – they are "out of the order".

Ekstatikós and *manikós* are harder to pinpoint precisely. The reasons for this difficulty lie in the fact that our vocabulary for various forms of mental states greatly differs from ancient vocabulary, due to the difference in understanding and explaining the idea of madness. As Thumiger (2013) and Ahonen (2014: 31-34) have clearly shown, the ancient Greek vocabulary of madness was incredibly diverse. Following the Hippocratic treatise *The Sacred Disease* that discusses epilepsy as a divine, prophetic affliction, the idea of madness in ancient Greece continually flirted with religious explanations. Some of the differences between mental disorders (such as mania and melancholia, for example) are so fine, and so culturally contingent, that it is almost impossible to translate them without losing their original meaning.[23] One such difference is between *ekstatikós* and *manikós*, which is why in most English translations *ekstatikós* from *Problems* XXX has been translated simply as "mad" (H. Rackham) or "being out of one's mind" (E. S. Forster). Thus, in order to understand this passage, and to understand why the greatness of melancholics comes from their "being out of themselves" (*ekstatikós*), we have to put *manikós* and *ekstatikós* in the context of Aristotle's own opus. In other words, we need to see what exactly Aristotle meant by them.

It is interesting that in her incredibly detailed paper on the vocabulary of madness in ancient Greece, Thumiger (2013) does not find *ekstatikós* as a word of interest. Since her analysis is focused on different types of *mania* (phrenitis and melancholia are excluded on the grounds of already being well researched), it seems that *ekstatikós* falls outside of the limits of manic behaviours. It is the opinion of Ahonen (2014: 93, n.91) that *manikós* and *ekstatikós* are mainly synonymous and used for describing overly excitable and irritable people and animals, and that in *Problems* XXX they exceptionally refer to real madness. This claim can be justified if we turn to Aristotle's *Poetics*, where we find the same pair in close relation to each other. In

---

23 For example, Tooney (2004: 15-25) interprets Orestes's explicit manic behavior as the melancholic one, emphasizing a very fine line between these specific forms of madness.

Poetics (1455a, 33), Aristotle explains that the best poets are the ones with the power to visualise their protagonists and assume their roles, and he concludes that that is precisely why "poetry needs either a sympathetic nature or a madman (*manikós*), the former being impressionable and the latter inspired (*ekstatikós*)". In this example, the link between them is clear: a madman is the one who is inspired in his madness. However, according to Jovanović (2007: 19, n.7), in *Problems* XXX, it is necessary to *differentiate* between these two terms, since they depict different temporalities of mind loss. More precisely, while there are those who are "out of themselves" (*ekstatikós*) as a result of a temporary "madness fit" (such as Hercules or Ajax), there are also those who are permanently "out of their minds" as in "insane" (*manikós*) and definitely crazy in the sense of a long-term derangement. Thus, back to the contentious passage from *Problems* XXX, in translating the line as "Maracus, the Syracusan, was actually a better poet when he was *out of himself*", instead of "Maracus, the Syracusan, was actually a better poet when he was *out of his mind*", Jovanović establishes a fine line between "being out of one's self – overcoming oneself" and "being out of one's self – alienating oneself". The difference is the one between ingenuity and madness. If we follow her in the understanding of *ekstatikós* as a psychological state of "overcoming oneself", we might be given a window into the essence of the melancholics' changeability.

Those afflicted with this puzzling illness, those capable of aggressive fits as well as profound despondency – the atrabilious – are, in their affliction, *given an opportunity* to "overcome themselves", to overcome the binding norms and expectations of the society. By equating melancholy with extraordinary (*perittós*) achievements that make melancholics great men, Aristotle implies that melancholics are fundamentally extra-ordinary (or have a potential to be), that they are *out-of-order* and out of the implied structure, out of the cultural system of norms and expectations that bind them; melancholics are "out of self" which is the embodiment of those norms and expectations. Being driven by the black bile, they are given a way out of conformism, and out of the signifying practices of their culture. In their conformism and in the extreme agility of their intuition, Democritus and Justine are given an opportunity to fight the oppression of social norms; they are given an opportunity to transcend them with their ever-changing, melancholic, polymorphous nature.

However, their affliction remains only an *opportunity*, a "gift" (of the gods or of the planet Melancholia that is to obliterate the Earth). What is to be done with it – what *can* be done with it – is a completely different issue.

DEMOCRITUS AND JUSTINE: LAUGHTER OR (SELF)DESTRUCTION

With a clearer understanding of the Aristotelian idea of melancholy, it is time to go back to Democritus and Justine and propose an answer to the question posed at the beginning: if melancholy leaves Justine broken and paralyzed, empty inside and with the taste of ash on her tongue, why is melancholic Democritus laughing?

By analysing the Aristotelian conceptualisation of melancholy, especially the one from spurious *Problems* XXX, I have shown the backdrop of Hippocrates's doubt that Democritus has become melancholic. Actually, without *Problems* XXX, it would be nearly impossible to understand the last part of the story surrounding the encounter of Hippocrates and Democritus. With a clearer idea that melancholic temperament gives an opportunity to the afflicted to be "out of order" (*perittoi*) and "out of themselves" (*ekstatikoi*), we are moving to the Thracian city of Abdera where Hippocrates (after some prior preparations and after having a prophetic dream) has just disembarked from his swift, sun-emblazoned vessel.

Hippocrates arrives to Abdera and, in the company of the whole town, is immediately taken to Democritus. He finds the philosopher in front of his isolated house, in the midst of books and vivisected animals. At the sight of his "deranged" state, the distressed citizens – whose worry for Democritus's sanity has metastasized into their own grieving madness – start pulling their hairs and pounding their chests. Initiating the assessment of his sanity, Hippocrates approaches Democritus asking him what he is working on. Democritus is, ironically, searching for the seat of madness in the human body. Hippocrates sees that, in spite of his melancholic pensiveness, yellow skin and distant gaze, there is nothing wrong with Democritus and finally asks him the dreaded question: why is he laughing at everything and everyone, even at things that are to be pitied and lamented? Democritus's answer is extremely lengthy, but this is what he essentially says to Hippocrates:

"You show that your spirit has become heavy, Hippocrates […]. Since their spirit is disturbed by everyday worries, as if they have any importance whatsoever, people let the fog of pride cloud their irrational minds and they do not want to learn anything from the mess they walk through; that would, however, be a warning enough of an all-pervading changeability of things […]. They want that which brings them sadness, they seek that which has no purpose […]. The one who would act within the one's own limits would protect their life from failure, achieving perfection in self-knowledge […] without infinitely fanning the flames of desire […]. Should I not laugh at the man who suffers from a love pain because – luckily – a barrier to his desires has been raised?" (Pseudo-Hipokrat 2007: 37-38)

What Democritus explains to Hippocrates is that his fellow citizens are ignorant and that their values, customs, needs and desires are all turned upside down. He has seen through the pettiness of their miniature lives that crave what can never have, and never want what already possess. Listening to Democritus explaining his laughter, Hippocrates himself becomes aware of the passion-driven nature of humanity, of that which today might be termed as a "human condition". Versed in the Aristotelian melancholy, we see that Democritus has taken advantage of his melancholic state and cast off the shackles of his culture. He is *ekstatikós* and he is *perittós*: in his melancholic "madness" he has overcome himself; in his residual, out-of-order, abnormal nature he has overcome the expectations of the society. He has seen through cultural norms that continually cast their net at him; he has seen through life itself. The language of his culture cannot interpellate him; the signs of his culture cannot signify him. Democritus is the example of extraordinariness of melancholics; he is the example of melancholy as the failure of culturally specific system of sings to signify and oppress.

Though this optimistic account of melancholic "madness" might seem deeply specific to Pseudo-Hippocrates, it seems clear that Justine's fate follows the same pattern – only with a different ending and resolution. After her complete breakdown under the weight of social expectations, Justine seems to miraculously "recover". As the planet Melancholia approaches the Earth and Justine's "stable" and "healthy" sister and brother-in-law mental-

ly collapse out of shear fear and insecurity (he commits suicide, while she goes berserk), Justine finds certain strength in the emptiness of her being. While everyone around her is in the state of panic and dismay, she faces the imminent destruction of the Earth calmly, even enjoying her newly discovered powers. Lars von Trier here brilliantly exposes the calmness depressive people can possess in the face of danger.

It might seem that these two scenarios (*Melancholia* and *Letter to Damagetus*), as well as their featuring portraits (Democritus and Justine) are quite different, due to different tones of their reactions to specific cultural codes. However, both of them show how melancholic people react under the pressure of society, and both of them create portraits whose contours emerge through the constant oppression of rules, signs and words of those around them. In their melancholic, depressive affliction, in their out-of-orderliness, they are both offered an escape from the heavy burden of society and from the never-satisfying, desire-driven affairs of humans. As the Abderites are pulling their hairs and pounding their chests lamenting over their "sick customs", Democritus steps out of the prescribed set of rules, centring himself in anti-sociality – in being an anti-subject. As the world is turning into dust under the impact of a foreign higher power (the extrasolar Melancholia), Justine finds her inner calm and strength to stoically suffer the impending doom.

It is clear that both Democritus and Justine are offered the opportunity to overcome the oppression, to let it (or make it) fail and free themselves through their atrabilious characters. However, it is the *script of this opportunity* that separates them. They are both examples of *langage* failing to signify the subject, but the difference lies in their responses to this failure. While Democritus choses to cast off the shackles of the society turning his affliction into a liberating power, Justine finds release only in the immanent destruction of the society itself. Democritus manages to overcome the society and to withstand the truth of its pettiness, while for Justine the only way out seems to be the destruction of the world as such. In his melancholy, in his escape from the signifying system of his culture, Democritus *has risen* and has seen through the pitiful, materialistic, desire-driven existence of humanity. In her melancholy, Justine *has broken down* under the burden of the society, only to rise again in the face of its complete destruction (implying that as long as there is culture, the prerogative of subject shaping will exist).

The *langage* failed to signify Democritus due to his transcendental *strength* to resist it; in Justine's case, it failed due to her *inability* to conform to it. Justine's speechlessness is the silence of a modern melancholic whose depressive state can be overcome only at the expense of the self's and the society's destruction; Democritus's laughter is the laughter of an ancient, divinely inspired melancholic that demonstrates an unfathomable lightness of being freed from the burden of language.

Although Justine waits for the world to be turned into cosmic dust and take her into the abyss while Democritus is basking in the light of spiritual and symbolic liberation, both of them achieve exactly what Aristotle describes: they both become *extra-ordinary*, leaving order and the repressive system of signs behind; they abandon themselves only to find themselves anew – crushed or spiritually elevated, silent or laughing, they are, nevertheless, awake.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Aristotle. 1927. "Problemata." In *The Works of Aristotle, vol. VII*. Edited by E. S. Forster. Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press.

Aristotle. 1927. "Problems XXII-XXXVIII." 1957. In *Aristotle*. Edited by W. S. Hett. 2-250. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Aristotle. 1927. "Parts of Animals." In *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Aristotle. 1927. "Movements of Animals." In *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Aristotle. 1927. "On Memory." In *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Aristotle. 1927. "On Divination in Sleep." In *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Aristotle. 1927. "Nicomachean Ethics." In *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Aristotle. 1927. "Eudemian Ethics." In *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Aristotle. 1932. "Poetics." In *Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 23*. Translated by W. H. Fyfe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd.

Diogenes Laertius. 1972. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Translated by R. D. Hicks. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hippocrates. 1957. "Aphorisms." In *Hippocrates, vol. IV, with an English translation by W. H. S Jones*. Edited by T. E. Page. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hippocrates. 1957. "Nature of Man." In *Hippocrates, vol. IV, with an English translation by W. H. S Jones*. Edited by T. E. Page. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hippocrates. 1957. "The Sacred Disease." In *Hippocrates, vol. II, with an English translation by W. H. S Jones*. Edited by T. E. Page. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hippocrates. 1957. "Airs, Water, Places." In *Hippocrates, vol. I, with an English translation by W. H. S Jones*. Edited by T. E. Page. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hippocrates. 1957. "Epidemics III." In *Hippocrates, vol. I, with an English translation by W. H. S Jones*. Edited by T. E. Page. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hippocrates. 1957. "The Sacred Disease." In *Hippocrates, vol. II, with an English translation by W. H. S Jones*. Edited by T. E. Page. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Pseudo-Hipokrat. 2007. "Demokritov smeh (Letter to Damagetus)." *Gradac* 160-161, 28-39.

Secondary Sources

Ahonen, M. 2014. *Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy*. New York: Springer.

Charlton, D. G. 1984. Ed. The French Romantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition. 2013. Washington, DC and London: American Psychiatric Publishing.

Drabkin, I. E. 1950. *Caelius Aurelianus: On Acute Diseases and On chronic diseases*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

van der Eijk, P. J. 1990. "Aristoteles über die Melancholie." *Mnemosyne* 43, 33-72.

van der Eijk, P. J. 2000. *Diocles of Carystus: A Collection of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary, vol. I*. Leiden: Brill.

Flashar, H. 1962. *Aristoteles: Problemata physica. Translation and commentary*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

Flashar, H. 1966. *Melancholie und Melancholiker in der medizinischen Theorien der Antike*. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Fredrich, C. 1889. "Hippokratische Untersuchungen." In *Philologische Untersuchungen, vol. XV*. Edited by A. Kiessling and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Berlin: Weidmann Buchhandlung.

Freud, S. 1916. "Morning and Melancholy." In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIV*. Edited by J. Strachey. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 243-258.

Hankinson, R. J. ed. 2008. *The Cambridge Companion to Galen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harris, W. V. 2013. "Thinking about Mental Disorders in Classical Antiquity." In *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*. Edited by W. V. Harris. Leiden: Brill.

Hughes, J. C. 2013. "If Only the Ancients Had Had DSM, All Would Have Been Crystal Clear: Reflections on Diagnosis." In *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*. Edited by W. V. Harris. Leiden: Brill.

Hoog, A. 1954. "Who invented the *mal du siècle*?." *Yale French Studies* 13, 42-51.

Jackson, S. W. 1969. "Galen on mental disorders." *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 5.4, 365-384.

Jackson, S. W. 1986. *Melancholia and Depression from Hippocratic Times to Modern Times*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Johnston, I. 2006. *Galen on Diseases and Symptoms*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, W. H. S. 1957. General Introduction to *Hippocrates, vol. I, with an English translation by W. H. S Jones*. Edited by T. E. Page. ix-lxix. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Jovanović, M. 2007. „O melanholiji: Aristotel." *Gradac* 160–161, 15–22.

Jouanna, J. 2013. "The Typology and Aetiology of Madness in Ancient Greek Medical and Philosophical Writing." In *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*. Edited by W. V. Harris. Leiden: Brill.

Kazantzidis, G. 2013. "'Quem nos furorem, μελαγχολίαν illi vocant': Cicero on Melancholy." In *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*. Edited by W. V. Harris. Leiden: Brill.

Klibansky et al. 1979. *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art*. Nendeln: Kraus.

Konstan, D. 2006. *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Kristeva, J. 1989. *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia*. Translated by L. S. Rouidiez. New York: Columbia University Press.

O'Brien-Moore, A. 1924. *Madness in Ancient Literature*. Weimar: R. Wagner Sohn.

Padel, R. 1995. *Whom gods destroy: Elements of Greek and Tragic Madness*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Petsko, G. A. 2012. "The Coming Epidemic of Neurologic Disorders: What Science Is – and Should Be – Doing about it." *Daedalus* 141.3, 98-107.

Pižo, Ž. 2007. „Genij i melanholija: Komentari uz Aristotelov tekst o melanholiji." *Gradac* 160–161, 23–27.

Pormann, P. E. ed. 2008. *Rufus of Ephesus: On Melancholy*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Sharma, A. 2005. *Religious Studies and Comparative Methodology*. Albany, USA: State University of New York Press.

Radden, J. ed. 2000. *The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sorabji, R. 1972. *Aristotle on Memory*. London: Duckworth.

Simon, B. 1978. *Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece: The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Simon, B. 2008. "Mind and madness in classical antiquity". *History of psychiatry and medical psychology*. Edited by E. R. Wallace IV and J. Gach. Dordrecht: Springer, 175-197.

Simon, B. 2013. "'Carving Nature at the Joints': The Dream of a Perfect Classification of Mental Illness." In *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*. Edited by W. V. Harris. Leiden: Brill.

Smith, W. D., ed. 1990. *Hippocrates, Pseudepigraphic Writings: Letters, Embassy, Speech from the Altar. Decree.* Leiden: Brill.

Starobinski, J. 2010. *La mélanacholie au miroir. Trois Lecture de Baudelaire*. Paris: Julliard.

Thumiger, C. 2013. "The Early Greek Medical Vocabulary of Insanity." In *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*. Edited by W. V. Harris. Leiden: Brill.

Toohey. P. 2004. *Melancholy, Love and Time: Boundaries of the Self in Ancient Literature*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

von Trier, Lars. 2011. *Melancholia*. Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France: Zentropa Entertainments. DVD.